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Abstract
The law of one wage does not strictly hold, nor should it be expected to hold, in contemporary labor
markets. The law of one wage, however, provides a surprisingly good first approximation of the structure
of U.S. wages. This generalization is drawn from research on a diverse set of topics: the Mincerian wage
equation and earnings imputation, union wage differentials, product market regulation and the labor
market, wages in male and female jobs, the wage effects of military service, and interarea wages and costof-living.
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* Presidential Address, presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association (SEA), New
Orleans, LA, November 20, 2007. I thank the many economists with whom I have interacted or co-authored over
the years, in particular, John Addison, Bill Breit, Bill Johnson, Dave Macpherson, and Ed Schumacher.

I.

Introduction
In the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith posited theory and institutional explanations for why wages

differ. Modern labor economics has retained a focus on wage differentials. Although much of the
literature is unabashedly empirical, it is informed by theory. Neoclassical economics, including human
capital theory, remains the principal approach, although labor economists recognize the role played by
human nature, workplace incentives, institutions, and public policy in wage determination.
In this address, I highlight several topics I have studied, all involving wage gaps. 1 These include
Census imputation methods, union wage premiums, product market regulation and deregulation, wages in
male and female jobs, the wage effects of military service, and interarea wages and cost-of-living. The
purpose is not to trumpet my work, although it may appear as such, but to draw broader conclusions about
labor economists’ understanding of wage determination.
II.

Equalizing Differentials and the Law of One Wage
The theory of equalizing differentials states that in competitive labor markets, workers with

similar skills working in similarly attractive jobs and locations should receive similar compensation.
Long-run wage differentials are explained by differences in skill and job disamenities, with a single
“price” (wage) conditional on worker and job attributes. 2 The law of one wage – equal compensation for
equivalent workers and jobs – follows naturally from competitive theory.
Empirical studies attempt to test the law of one price in product markets. I.O. economists focus on
a narrow set of homogeneous goods in markets with low-cost information and similar transportation
costs; say, purchases of electronics and books at Internet sites. International economists test for
purchasing power parity (PPP) for homogeneous goods; say, Big Mac prices across countries (for a recent
paper, see Parsley and Wei 2007). Even in these markets, there is considerable deviation from the law of
one price.
One does not see an equivalent literature in labor economics. Yes, there is a vast literature on
wage gaps, but authors rarely characterize such work as a test of a “law of one wage” because there is
little expectation that there should be wage equality, even conditional on controls. Why not? First, as
emphasized in the literature on personnel economics, pay schemes that maximize profits often involve
wages deviating from spot marginal products, thus creating competitive wage differences across similar
workers in similar jobs (Lazear and Oyer 2007). Second, there are rigidities in labor markets owing to
1

A quick point on terminology is in order. I will use the terms wage differential and wage gap interchangeably. At times
these terms will refer to raw wage gaps and at other times to gaps with controls for other wage determinants. And while I use
the term “wage” throughout the paper, it is sometimes used as shorthand for total compensation. The precise meanings of
“wage” and “gap” should be clear in context. Finally, wage gaps are reported in log points, which I refer to as percentage
changes. They are percentages, albeit ones with an intermediate wage base between the target and reference groups.
2
Worker heterogeneity in preferences and skills leads to upward-sloping rather than horizontal supply curves in labor markets.
Hence, the magnitude of a wage gap is determined at the margin and influenced by the level of demand as well as supply.
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imperfect mobility, say from information and search costs, firm-specific training, personal job attachment,
or tied household decisions regarding jobs, location, and housing (Manning 2003; Mortensen 2003).
Third are problems of measurement, leading to apparent variation in wages even when there is none. And
fourth, even were data error free, we cannot hope to measure all the multitude of worker and job attributes
that influence wages.
How bad is it? It depends on whether you see the glass as half-empty or half-full. The Mincerian
human capital earnings equation (Mincer 1974; Chiswick 1974) serves as the workhorse of wage gap
studies. 3 Workers’ wages are modeled as a multiplicative function of time investments in human capital,
in its most basic form with the natural logarithm of earnings a linear function of years of schooling and a
quadratic of potential work experience. With the help of a few heroic assumptions, the schooling
coefficient is interpreted as a rate of return to schooling investments and the coefficients on the experience
profile reflect a combination of postschool investment intensity, investment length, and the returns to
postschool training.
For example, estimating this canonical wage equation using the 2004-2006 Current Population
Survey (CPS) earnings files and a combined sample of men and women, I obtain:
(1)

ln(Wage) = 0.887 + 0.107 School + .039 Exp – .067 Exp2/100

R2 = .339

Rs = 10.7%

Rate of return to schooling investment

t* = 29.2

Years experience at peak of earnings-experience profile

T* = 19.2

Years of positive postschool investment (assumed to equal t*-10)

K0 = .257

Initial postschool training investment ratio

Rp = 8.7%

Rate of return to postschool investment in human capital

n = 354,132

The coefficient on Schooling, .107, is interpreted as an average rate of return (ignored are important issues
such as ability bias and selection.); more accurately, it simply says that on average an additional year of

schooling is associated with approximately 10.7% higher hourly earnings. The coefficients on potential
experience Exp and its square Exp2 imply a peak of earnings at 29.2 years of experience (age 49), an
initial investment ratio of .257 that declines linearly over an investment span of 19.2 years, and a rate of
return on postschool training investments of 8.7% (for calculation details, see Mincer 1974; Freeman and
Hirsch 2001).
Although this is a highly simplistic model, I find it remarkable that a specification using
information on only two worker attributes, schooling and age, accounts for a third of the total variation in
individual worker earnings and allows us to infer very roughly key human capital investment parameters. 4

3

For recent work combined with a look back, see the papers in Grossbard (2006).
Of course, positive earnings-schooling and earnings-age relationships are consistent with alternative models of the earnings
generation process.
4
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I next estimate a dense specification of the Mincerian wage equation of the sort seen widely in the
literature. This includes 77 rather than 3 explanatory variables, many of these being dummy variables for
such things as schooling degree, broad occupation and industry, region, city size, and a host of
demographic variables. There is a labor economics literature surrounding most of these variables.
Introduction of 74 additional covariates raises the R2 to “only” .528, or from about a third to a half.
Indeed, it is rare that one accounts for over half of the individual variation in earnings in a wage equation.
Is one half high or low? Some argue this is low and suggest that much about earnings
determination is inexplicable, say the result of luck or randomness in the labor market. I take the half-full
rather than half-empty view, for those same reasons stated earlier as to why we do not test a law of one
wage. For example, while we account for schooling, potential experience, and other personal and location
attributes, these are imperfect measures of human capital, failing to measure the quality of training,
worker ability, and personal motivation, all of which affect productivity and earnings. Mismeasurement
of earnings and other attributes is likely to increase the residual variation. For example, I excluded from
the estimation samples the roughly 30% of workers who do not report their earnings and instead have
them imputed or assigned by the Census (a topic I return to shortly). Had I included imputed earners, as
is standard in the literature, this would lower the R2 by 6 points, from .528 to .466.
No apology is needed for accounting for only half of measured earnings. That said, measurement
and specification issues make it difficult to interpret the residual variance and thus say just how large is
the deviation from the law of one wage. 5 Where the Mincer equation has proven itself invaluable is in the
study of key wage determinants. Much of my work, at least what I focus on in this lecture, examines
labor market wage gaps that shed light on specific topics, for example, union wage premiums or interarea
wage differences. I will argue that such studies also tell us something about the competitiveness of U.S.
labor markets and whether the law of one wage provides a reasonable first approximation of how wages
are determined.
III.

Match Bias from Imputation: Wage Gaps Larger than We Think?
A theme running through empirical labor studies is that better control for and measurement of

worker and job attributes will lessen the magnitude of what appear to be noncompetitive wage gaps.
Estimated wage gaps due to, say, unions, employment in large firms, industry, marriage, etc. would be
smaller if only we had better measures of relevant worker skills and job attributes correlated with these
regressors. Such reasoning is logical and often correct. For example, Hirsch (2005) shows how part-

5

Likewise, a large residual variance associated with imperfect models and data limits our understanding of wage inequality.
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time/full-time wage gaps for women and men decline as one controls for worker, location, and detailed
job characteristics. 6
In this section, I discuss my research on Census earnings imputation and what I have dubbed
“match bias” (Hirsch and Schumacher 2004; Bollinger and Hirsch 2006). Routine inclusion of imputed
earners in wage regressions not only increases residual wage dispersion, as one would expect, but
severely attenuates (biases toward zero) wage gap estimates for attributes that are not imputation match
criteria. This bias affects no small portion of the large literature using the CPS to estimate wage gaps.
Many labor market wage differentials are not smaller but, rather, larger than we think. Let me explain.
CPS monthly earnings files since 1979 include edited earnings variables in which the Census
imputes values for those who refuse or are unable to report earnings, once about 15% of workers and now
about 30%. Details on the specifics of imputation procedure have not been publicly provided, but were
obtained from BLS and Census employees. Labor economists routinely include imputed earners in their
samples, either oblivious to the issue or under the belief that the impact is minimal (Angrist and Krueger
1999), as would be expected if measurement error on a dependent variable were random. My work with
Ed Schumacher and Chris Bollinger shows that inclusion of imputed earners introduces bias that is
systematic and large. Imputed values are obtained by assigning to each worker with missing earnings the
earnings of a matched “donor” with an identical set of attributes (gender, plus broad categories for age,
race, schooling, occupation, and hours worked). Wage determinants such as union status, industry,
foreign-born, Hispanic, marital status, veteran, region, city size, and many others are not imputation
match criteria. Inclusion of imputed earners creates “match bias” – attenuation of wage gap estimates
with respect to nonmatch attributes. This bias is about 25% using recent data.
The intuition is straightforward. Consider union status. Union workers who do not report
earnings are likely to be assigned the earnings of a nonunion donor. And a small portion of nonunion
workers who do not report earnings are assigned the earnings of a union donor. For the 30% of the
estimation sample made up of imputed earners, the union-nonunion wage gap is close to zero. Measures
of match bias are derived and alternative estimation approaches are examined in Hirsch and Schumacher
(2004) and Hirsch and Bollinger (2006). The simplest approach, and not a bad one at that, is to omit
imputed earners from the estimation sample.
In Figure 1, I illustrate the match bias from imputation using results from my 2006 paper with
Chris Bollinger. Shown are wage gap estimates associated with the following non-match criteria: union
status, foreign born, Hispanic, industry, region, and metro size. The estimates are for men from the 1998-

6

Based on wage level equations, the part-time wage disadvantage among women falls from an unadjusted 22% to 9% with a
full set of controls. Equivalent estimates among men are 46% and 19%. Part-time wage gap estimates are even smaller using
longitudinal analysis, which identifies the gap based on workers switching between full-time and part-time jobs.
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2002 CPS, the proportion of imputed earners being 28.7% (results for women are included in the article).
In each example, the “unbiased” respondent sample estimate is shown in the third bar. Estimates for the
full sample and imputed earners are shown in the first two bars. The full sample estimates, standard in the
literature, are roughly a weighted average of the other two.
Attenuation from match bias is severe, approximately 25% in each case. For example, the biased
full sample estimate of the union wage gap is .142 log points, 26% lower than the .191 estimate obtained
from the respondent sample (and .024 among the sample of imputed earners). Comparing foreign born to
native workers, the full sample estimate is a -.099 earnings disadvantage for foreign-born workers, versus
a respondent sample estimate of -.130, attenuation of 24%. And so forth. Attenuation in industry, city
size, and region wage gaps can be seen by comparing the mean absolute deviation across coefficient
estimates. The mean absolute deviation across 7 city size categories, for example, is .094 in the full
sample versus .125 in the respondent sample (and .011 in the imputed sample), a downward bias of 25%.
These examples show that match bias from earnings imputation is a first-order problem for CPS wage gap
estimates for non-match earnings attributes.
Among earnings attributes that are imputation match criteria, but are matched imperfectly, match
bias is more complex (Bollinger and Hirsch 2006). For example, earnings nonrespondents are assigned
the earnings of a donor based on three broad education categories, those without a high school degree,
those with a high school degree (including a GED) or some college, and those with a BA degree or above.
As one would expect, for those with imputed earnings, wages do not rise in steady lock-step with
education, but in three rather flat steps with large jumps between the education categories. This is readily
evident in Figure 2, showing the returns to schooling among women (the same pattern is seen for men).
The “diamond” line shows earnings for respondents. The “square” line shows the imputed earnings for
nonrespondents. Respondent earnings rise systematically with schooling. Nonrespondents’ imputed
earnings are flat within schooling match categories, but jump dramatically between categories.
Bias can be extreme for those with earnings far from the weighted average within an education
category, for example those with a PhD or GED (on the latter, see Heckman and LaFontaine 2006). As
evident in Figure 2, the returns to a GED are greatly exaggerated due to imperfect donor matching, since
most nonrespondents with a GED are assigned the earnings of a donor with a regular high school degree
or some college. Just the opposite bias is found for those with a PhD, since those who fail to report
earnings are assigned earnings of donors primarily with a BA degree. By contrast, there is little bias
found for those with the BA degree, since most BA nonrespondents will be assigned the earnings of a BA
donor.
Note that the “match bias” I have discussed is a result of imputation and exists even if
nonresponse is random. Corrections for match bias, however, including the use of the respondent-only
5

sample, assume that nonresponse is conditional missing at random, with no difference in earnings among
respondents and nonrespondents once one conditions on measured earnings attributes. In on-going work
with Chris Bollinger (Bollinger and Hirsch 2007), we use selection models and longitudinal analysis to
evaluate whether there exists response bias and to examine the relationship between proxy household
respondents and nonresponse. Our preliminary conclusion is that there is negative selection into
response, but it is restricted to men in the tails of the distribution. Proxy earnings responses exhibit small
differences from self-reported earnings. Whatever the precise magnitude of response bias, it is of secondorder importance as compared to match bias.
IV.

Union Wage Gaps
H. Gregg Lewis is widely associated with the notion that union wage premiums are on the order of

15%, although a careful reading of his work reveals that he thought the true figure was lower (Lewis
1986). A principal argument for a premium lower than standard OLS estimates is that high union wages
should be competed away, at least in part, through skill upgrading. A second stylized “fact” about union
wages is that premiums are highest for low-skill workers and lowest for high-skill workers.
My work has questioned these two stylized facts, both the importance of skill upgrading and the
large differences in premiums across worker groups. Skepticism on skill upgrading is warranted on
several grounds. First, in most union work settings, both management and union rank-and-file clearly
believe the union wage impact is 15% or higher, a belief viewed negatively by management and
positively by unions. Second, a related literature on the productivity of union and nonunion companies
does not offer evidence supporting skill upgrading. While these studies leave much to be desired, U.S.
evidence suggests an average union productivity effect that is positive, but small and possibly zero, and
highly variable across firms and industries (Hirsch 2004). Third, and most important, skill upgrading
need not follow in theory in a repeated bargaining framework. As argued by Wessels (1994), if firms
upgrade in response to a union wage increase, the union can bargain in a future period to restore the
premium. Employers, anticipating this, may choose not to upgrade. In short, it does not necessarily
follow that firms can or will use skill-upgrading to offset union wage increases.
My work on union wage premiums concludes: 1) the union wage premium exceeds the Lewis
consensus, with premium estimates higher than typically seen in the literature and declining less over
time; and 2) union premiums differ relatively little with respect to measured skill level. The first
conclusion is a clear-cut result of accounting for imputed earnings and is (now) uncontroversial for those
familiar with this problem. The second conclusion rests on limited longitudinal evidence that is rather
less clear-cut.
We saw previously that inclusion of imputed earners causes union premium estimates to be
attenuated by about 25%. The impact was less for earlier years when imputation rates were lower.
6

Census did not impute earnings among non-respondents in the earnings files prior to 1979, so 1973-78
estimates are not affected by imputation. In Figure 3, CPS estimates of the union-nonunion wage
premium in the private sector are shown, these from my 2004 paper with Ed Schumacher which first
addressed the match bias issue.
Estimates in the literature use the 1973-78 CPS, shown by the first six squares, and then beginning
in 1979, the Census began inclusion of imputed earners in the public use CPS files, these full-sample
estimates shown by the diamonds. Based on the full-sample series, one observes a puzzlingly large drop
in the union premium between 1978 and 1979 (moving from the 1978 square to 1979+ diamond series)
and a relatively gradual but large decline in the union premium since the early 1980s. Each of these
patterns is due in no small part to the effect of imputed earners.
About two-thirds of the apparent decline in the premium between 1979 and 1980 was due to the
introduction of earnings imputations in the Census public use files, an event unannounced to researchers.
This puzzling result was discussed in a 1986 book by Lewis and 1986 article by Richard Freeman, but not
resolved. Second, one sees that union wage premium estimates are considerably higher once one omits or
otherwise corrects for the match bias due to imputed earnings. The bias due to imputation is the principal
reason why my belief about the magnitude of the union premium exceeds the conventional wisdom. And
third, while there is decline in the union wage premium since 1983, it is far less than one would conclude
based on use of the full CPS samples containing increasing numbers of imputed earners. Private sector
union density has declined from 24.2% to 7.4% since 1973, but union wage effects have remained
substantial. I should note that since 2001, there has been little change in the union wage premium (Hirsch
and Macpherson 2007). 7
The other stylized fact I have questioned regarding union premiums is that that they are
substantially higher for low-skill than for high-skill workers. This result shows up in standard crosssectional regression analysis. For example, in Figure 4, I present wage level estimates from the 1989-94
CPS (Hirsch and Schumacher 1998). The overall union premium is estimated as 18%, but this ranges
from 24% for dropouts, 20% for high school grads, 17% for those with some college, and only 8% for
those with a BA or above. The CPS sample also permits panel estimation, with individual workers
interviewed in consecutive years. Wage change equation based on the 1989-90 through 1993-94 matched
samples identify the union wage effect based on workers switching union status, from union to nonunion

7

I ignore several estimation issues. Eren (2007) provides non-parametric matching estimates of the union premium using the
PSID. He shows that conditioning linearly on wage covariates (as in OLS) causes a downward bias in the union gap. Eren
also finds that log wage estimation biases upward the percentage union gap, as shown previously in Blackburn (2007).
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or nonunion to union, thus controlling for unmeasured worker heterogeneity (fixed effects). The
longitudinal estimates are virtually identical across the four schooling groups – 12%. 8
The sharp difference between the wage level and the longitudinal estimates is due to two-sided
selection (Card 1996). Among workers with low credentials (say, dropouts) there is positive selection,
union employers are likely to hire and retain only those with high unmeasured skills. Among those with
high credentials (college grads), workers most likely to be in the union job queue are those with low
unmeasured skills compared to the average college graduate. The fact that unions compress wages, both
across and within positions, accentuates the two-sided selection, leading to a high degree of homogeneity
within union workplaces.
The evidence on union wage premiums indicates that they are large and are not accounted for by
unmeasured skills or by higher productivity in union workplaces, at least not to any major degree. Union
premiums provide a clear violation of the law of one wage. As unions have attempted to maintain their
wage advantage, competitive forces, combined with managerial antipathy, have sharply eroded density,
unions now surviving in increasingly tiny pockets of the private sector economy (Hirsch 2008).
V.

Regulation, Product Market Competition, and Unions
Labor demand is derived from product demand. Thus, a regulated product market in which price

competition and entry are restricted may produce rents that can be captured in part by unions. I have
examined the labor market effects of deregulation in trucking and airlines. 9 The theoretical and empirical
framework used to analyze these industries is similar. But outcomes in these industries have proven
rather different.
Trucking provides a nearly textbook example of the role of competition. As seen in Figure 5, in
1976, prior to deregulation, 42% of truck drivers were union members (60% in the regulated for-hire
sector); density among all workers across the regulated for-hire trucking industry was 48%. Just ten years
later, following deregulation, density had declined to 28% among all truck drivers and to 27% among all
employees in the for-hire industry. By 2006, density is 15% and 12%, respectively, a fraction of what it
was prior to deregulation, although higher than the 7.4% density for the entire private sector.
Union drivers realized substantial wage premiums during the regulatory period (Rose 1987;
Hirsch 1988). Some rents spilled over to nonunion drivers and non-regulated sectors of the industry.
Deregulation brought about rapid entry of nonunion trucking operations and a shift of traffic from
company-operated trucks toward the increasingly competitive for-hire sector. Real wages for drivers fell.
8

These results are affected by incomplete removal of imputed earnings and incomplete correction for measurement error in
union status. The latter biases downward the longitudinal estimates, although we have little reason to believe differences
across schooling groups are greatly affected. For a related analysis, see Card (1986).
9
See Hirsch (1988, 1993, 2007) and Hirsch and Macpherson (1998, 2000). In related fashion, unions have captured and
largely maintained gains for their members in the regulated U.S. Postal Service (Hirsch, Wachter, and Gillula 1999).
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Union drivers continued to receive higher wages than nonunion drivers, although much of the remaining
union wage advantage reflects occupational experience and driver-specific skills (Hirsch 1993). In short,
easy entry and competition largely eliminated systematic rents from what is a naturally competitive
industry. Standard theory does a good job accounting for the outcome of trucking deregulation.
Of course de-unionization has not been restricted to previously regulated industries. Even in
automotive vehicles and parts, those quintessential union industries, competitive forces eventually
produced a marketplace in which prices and wages were increasingly determined by nonunion rather than
unionized companies (Hirsch 2008). Figure 6 shows that total employment in the vehicle and parts
industries has increased between 1973 and 2006, but have transitioned from largely union to largely
nonunion industries.
Results in the airline industry look rather different from trucking or automotives. Roughly half of
all workers in the air transportation industry were union members prior to deregulation; approximately
half are union members today. With the exception of Delta, nearly all flight and ground workers among
the major carriers are unionized. Union employment and wages in the airline industry are far from
immune from competitive pressures, however. Apart from American Airlines, every legacy carrier at the
time of deregulation has either failed, had its operations merged into another airline, or been in
bankruptcy.
Airline unions retain enormous bargaining power; a strike by any major craft has the ability to
shut down an entire airline. Such a catastrophic event will be avoided of course. What has emerged is a
lagged wage-profit cycle such that airline unions obtain substantial wage premiums following good times
and agree to concessions following bad times. In Figure 7, estimates are shown for the period 1995 to
2006, which includes both good and bad times. Union pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, fleet service,
and agents received an average estimated wage premium of 25%, as compared to non-airline employees at
similar levels of work (Hirsch 2007). Premiums are particularly large for union pilots at 36%, while
running from 17%-22% for other crafts. There is little wage advantage, on average, for nonunion
workers.
In the late 1990s, airlines realized strong profits. Contracts negotiated as this period was ending
promised large future pay increases. A “perfect storm” of events then occurred in the early 2000’s as
these pay increases took effect – a recession, reduced traffic following the 9/11 attacks, Internet pricing
that lowered carriers’ margins, destruction of pension wealth in the 2000 market decline, and, later, rising
fuel costs. Something had to give. US Airways, United, Delta, and Northwest went into bankruptcy in
order to reduce their debt and force substantial labor concessions. American narrowly avoided filing for
bankruptcy in 2003 following union concessions. Labor relations at several (but not all) carriers went
from historically bad to worse as labor concessions took place.
9

The decline in labor costs coupled with robust demand allowed major U.S. carriers to return to
profitability in 2006, despite high fuel costs. As these labor agreements expire in the coming years, the
real test for the industry begins. The lessons learned during the “perfect storm” no doubt differ for airline
workers and management. Union rank-and-file want to regain wages and benefits lost under the threat of
bankruptcy. Yet if they press too hard to do so, we will see a continuation of the profit-wage cycling that
has proven unsustainable in the past.
Management will resist pay demands unlikely to permit long-term profitability, but in a crunch
they have little choice. It is conceivable, although perhaps not likely, that there will be agreements that
provide modest wage increases maintaining cost-competitive compensation. Carriers achieving this
outcome might prosper and provide job security to their workforce. Airline workers would continue to
receive compensation superior to that available outside the industry.
What I do not see in the airline industry in the near future is widespread de-unionization or a shift
to competitive, opportunity cost wages; that is, what we saw in the deregulated trucking industry, or what
is currently occurring in the automotive assembly and parts industries. Yes, product market competition
limits prices and what unions can demand, but does not prevent the sharing of rents and quasi-rents. It is
possible, perhaps likely, that a competitive pay level will eventually emerge in the airline industry. But
nearly 30 years after deregulation, that outcome is not imminent.
VI.

A Tale of Two Jobs: Nursing, Truck Drivers, and Comparable Worth
This section draws on three seemingly unrelated lines of research that, taken together, illustrate

important features of the U.S. labor market. First is the work discussed above on deregulation and truck
driver earnings. Second is research with Ed Schumacher examining the earnings of registered nurses
(RNs). A principal focus of that research is the role of “classic” and “new” monopsony on the earnings of
hospital RNs (Hirsch and Schumacher 2005). We find that RNs display substantial mobility across
employers and that hospital concentration has little effect on RN wages. Third is work with Dave
Macpherson (1995) in which we examine the role of occupational segregation by sex on the earnings of
women and men. Although earnings are higher in predominantly male and lower in predominantly
female occupations, we conclude that much (not all) of the effect of gender composition is accounted for
by worker heterogeneity, job skill requirements, and working conditions. Gender composition explains
only a modest amount of the overall gender wage gap.
These disparate lines of research are used below to illustrate two of the more important features of
the U.S. labor market since the mid-1970s, widening wage differentials with respect to skill and a
narrowing of the gender wage gap. The evidence also suggests that the sex composition of occupations is
not a primary wage determinant.
10

During the 1970s and early 1980s, there was considerable interest in “comparable worth”
legislation (e.g., Killingsworth 1990). The intent was to narrow the gender wage gap by administering
wages based on job evaluations that measure the skills, responsibilities, and working conditions of jobs.
Underlying the argument for comparable worth was the belief that “female jobs” are systematically
undervalued in the labor market. A common example used at the time was that male truck drivers were
being paid more than were female registered nurses, despite that fact that the latter occupation requires
considerably more skill.
I will not revisit arguments for and against comparable worth, but it is worth examining wage
changes among truck drivers and registered nurses since that time, as shown in Figure 8. First, the
stylized “fact” that male truck drivers were paid more than female RNs in the 1970s was never a fact, the
average wage (in 2006$) for male drivers in 1976 being $18.18 and for female RNs $19.98. It is true that
union truck drivers, with an average wage of $22.82, earned more than RNs, but even at that time, 58% of
drivers were not union members.
Since the mid-1970s, it is difficult to identify major occupations with slower wage growth than
truck drivers or major occupations with faster wage growth than nursing. By 2006, the mean wage of
female RNs is $27.85, far higher than the $15.64 found for male truck drivers. In 2006, only 14.7% of
truck drivers were unionized, and their earnings ($20.94) are substantially below that of the average nurse.
The near absence of comparable worth legislation does not appear to have retarded wage growth among
nurses or to have bolstered it among truck drivers. 10
If gender composition does not explain the large change in relative wages among truck drivers and
nurses, what does? Some of the decline in trucking wages from their 1970s level was the result of
deregulation and the erasure of labor rents brought about through entry, price competition, and deunionization. The longer run trends, however, say more about changing skill premiums in the US
economy. Relative labor demand and wages for male semi-skilled and low-skilled workers declined
throughout the economy. While employment for production workers in manufacturing stagnated due to
labor-saving technology, demand for truck drivers has remained robust. But entry into trucking is
relatively easy, the principal barriers being clean driving records, drug testing, and, for long-haul drivers,
time away from home. Absent entry barriers, trucking wages have declined along with those for other
low- and semi-skilled workers.
RN wage growth during these years has exceeded the average for all college-educated women,
which in turn has exceeded growth economy-wide. Such rapid growth appears to be best explained by
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Gender segregation in these occupations has moderated, but not dramatically so. The proportion of truck drivers who are
men decreased from 97 to 95 percent between 1983 and 2006. During the same period, the proportion of RNs who are women
fell from 96 to 92 percent (Hirsch and Macpherson, 1994, Table 8c; 2007, Table 8a).
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slow labor supply relative to demand growth. As sex discrimination declined and employment
opportunities for college-educated women improved, labor supply in traditional female jobs such as
nursing and teaching has fallen. Despite rising demand for health care workers, the supply of RNs has
been restricted by limits on the number of enrollment slots made available in nursing training programs.
My research on sex segregation and the gender wage gap, nursing monopsony, and unions and
trucking regulation, were unrelated projects addressing different questions. Yet, taken together, they
provide a revealing tale of two occupations. The disparate wage paths seen for nurses and truck drivers
nicely illustrate important features of the contemporary labor market – a rising skill premium, the
declining gender wage gap, and, a rather modest causal impact of gender composition on wages.
VII.

Military Service and Civilian Earnings
Another line of research in which I have estimated wage gaps, early in my career with Mark

Berger (Berger and Hirsch 1983) and twenty years later with Steve Mehay (Hirsch and Mehay 2003), is
the effect of military service on subsequent civilian earnings. The work with Mark focused on Vietnamera veterans, although we examined earlier cohorts of veterans as well. The results of that research, which
suggested small negative effects of Vietnam-era military service, hold up surprisingly well. 11 But a
severe limitation of our work was the inability to account explicitly for double-sided selection, a selection
mechanism among recruits to enter the military queue and selection from the queue by the military.
The earnings effect of Vietnam-era service (1964-1975), when the draft played a major role,
cannot be generalized to the post-1973 period of the all-volunteer military. But theory is helpful,
specifically the law of one wage. Given reasonable assumptions, we expect that for the marginal
(voluntary) military entrant, expected gains from time spent in active-duty military service should roughly
equal equivalent time spent working in the civilian labor market. This is what standard OLS wage
analysis from the CPS indicates, but CPS data provide no obvious way to account for selection.
My work with Mehay arguably accounts for selection during the all-volunteer era, not through use
of using instrumental variables but through reliance on a unique database. We examine a survey of
military reservists that includes both standard CPS type variables (including current civilian earnings) and
detailed information on past military service. The reservist sample is an interesting one. First, it contains
a mix (about 60-40) of veterans (i.e., those with active-duty service) and nonveterans. Second, the
reservist sample of nonveterans arguably provides a matched comparison group for veterans that accounts
for selection. The criteria for service in the reserves are nearly identical to those for active-duty service,
thus accounting for selection by the military. And one can argue that many of the preferences that would
lead individuals to choose military service would be similar for active-duty and reserve service. If one
11

Angrist and Chen (2007), who revisit earlier work on those affected by the Vietnan-era draft lottery, conclude that the longrun effects of military service on civilian earnings were minimal.
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buys into our argument, then comparison of civilian earnings among reservists with and without activeduty service provides reliable estimate of the civilian wage effect of military service. 12
What do we find? The results are close to what is found using standard OLS analysis from the
CPS. 13 There is a close-to-zero wage difference associated with active-duty military service, a zero
average treatment effect among the treated. More precisely, among the enlisted ranks, there is a small
negative veteran effect of a percent or two, with some differences seen by military branch and variation in
results depending on whether one’s military occupation matched one’s broad civilian occupation.
Although the principal story is that active-duty service has a close to zero average treatment effect,
other intriguing results emerge. We find that it is essential to separate officers from enlisted personnel,
something not possible with most data sets. 14 An additional finding concerns race. Previous studies,
including my earlier work with Berger, find positive military service wage gain for blacks but not whites.
I had been skeptical of this result, believing that much of the difference was likely to reflect selection; that
is, unobserved differences between black veterans and nonveterans. I was surprised to see a substantial
veteran-nonveteran wage advantage among black reservists, convincing me that for the larger population
of African Americans, the wage advantage among veterans is to some degree a causal effect of military
service.
Finally, the reservist sample contained a reasonably large sample of women, a group that only
recently could be studied (Mehay and Hirsch 1996). Using standard CPS data, we find little wage
difference between female veterans and nonveterans, seemingly consistent with evidence for men. But
using the reservist sample, which mitigates bias from selection, a civilian wage penalty is found for
women with active-duty service. Our interpretation is that during the time period under study, the few
women admitted into active-duty service were unusually able (positive selection), but once serving in the
military these women were denied access to many of the positions that would provide a subsequent payoff
in the civilian sector.
The relevance of research on veterans for this address is twofold. First, evidence that active-duty
military service and civilian experience among men have similar effects on subsequent earnings provides
yet another example where the competitive model and law of one wage provide a good first
approximation as to how labor markets work. Second, it further illustrates how theoretical guidance,
knowledge of institutions, and appropriate data are essential for interpreting evidence and drawing reliable
conclusions.
12

In the paper we discuss reasons whether or not the active-duty “treatment” effect for reservists might be safely generalized to
the larger population including non-reservists.
13
The similarity suggests that using OLS estimates from the CPS, positive selection bias at the low end of the quality
distribution is roughly cancelled out by negative selection bias at the upper end.
14
Whereas enlisted personnel displayed a close-to-zero veteran-nonveteran wage gap, there is a substantial veteran wage
advantage for officers. We discuss reasons for this gap in the paper.
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VIII. Area Wage Differentials
There is little mystery as to why large wage differences across countries are sustained, given
language, immigration, and other mobility impediments. Less easy to understand are wage differences
across U.S. labor markets, even after accounting for education, age, and other worker and job attributes.
What’s going on? This is not the place to provide a comprehensive answer. But I will address a popular
response to that question – the assertion that wage differences largely reflect cost-of-living differences.
Anecdotal evidence of such a response can be seen by the existence of Internet sites providing city costof-living calculators intended to compare so-called real wages.
Labor and urban economists examining interarea differentials typically focus on nominal wages.
In part, a reluctance to adjust for cost-of-living stems from concerns about price data availability and
quality. But caution is also warranted because of theoretical ambiguity. Yes, all else the same, workers
require higher wages to work in high cost-of-living areas. But area amenities and disamenities are not
easily measured. Amenities valued by workers (say, good weather, being near water, low crime, good
schools) tend to lower wages, all else the same, while driving up land values and measured cost-of-living
(Roback 1982). The law of one wage leads not to the conclusion that either nominal or cost-of-living
adjusted (so-called “real”) wages should be equal across markets but, rather, the utility of equivalent
workers should equalize at the margin. High prices not driven by area amenities require higher
compensation, but high prices reflecting amenities have an ambiguous effect on wages. Wages rise with
cost-of-living, but not one-for-one. 15
What is the evidence? In a paper with Mike DuMond and Dave Macpherson (DuMond et al.
1999), we use individual worker data for 1985-1995 to examine wage differences across 185 U.S.
metropolitan areas. One question we ask is whether adjusting wages fully for cost-of-living leads one to
see lower wage dispersion across cities. The answer is no. Shown in on the left side of Figure 9 is the
mean absolute wage dispersion across metropolitan areas, after controlling for numerous worker, job, and
location characteristics. We measure intercity dispersion using four approaches, one using nominal
wages, a second with wages fully adjusted for cost of living, and a third and fourth in which we control
for the log of the area price index on the right-hand-side of the wage equation, thus allowing partial
adjustment for cost of living, in one case with a linear term and the other with a quadratic.
Results are clear-cut. In the wage equations without area amenities, the mean absolute deviation
of unexplained intercity nominal wage dispersion is .07 log points. Adjusting fully for cost of living (so15

It is more complicated than this. As argued above, utility maximization among workers does not lead to equal wages,
nominal or price-adjusted. Firms, however, seek to maximize profits. If output is sold largely outside of the local (i.e.,
producing) marketplace, firms should locate where nominal labor (and other operating) costs are lowest. Firm location
decisions, therefore, would tend to equalize nominal wages. If large cities with high prices and wages are to maintain these
differentials, then there must be offsetting productivity advantages attached to city size (see, for example, Rauch 1993).
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called real wages) increases dispersion to .08. However, partial adjustment for price differences sharply
reduces intercity wage differences, to .04 based on a linear and .035 based on a quadratic adjustment.
As evident on the right-side of Figure 9, explicitly accounting for measurable area amenities
reduces unexplained wage differentials across markets. Dispersion is larger using “real” rather than
nominal wages, but lower with partial adjustment for cost of living. In short, much of what appear to be
unexplained wage differences across labor markets can be accounted for by controlling for area amenities
and providing partial adjustment for cost of living, with wages rising about half as fast as do prices.
This same pattern can be seen looking at regional and city size differentials. For example, over
the years there has been a literature examining wage differences between the south and non-south, most
recently an Association Lecture given at last year’s SEA Meetings in Charleston by Ed Glaeser (Glaeser
and Tobio 2008). Conclusions regarding relative wages in the south are highly sensitive to treatment of
cost of living, as evident in Figure 10. In DuMond et al. (1999), nominal wages in southern cities are
almost .08 lower than in the non-south, absent control for city size or amenities. Controlling fully for
cost-of-living, the 8% wage disadvantage flips to an 8% advantage. Neither so large a wage advantage
nor disadvantage is plausible by the 1990s. With partial adjustment, effected by inclusion of lnP in the
wage equation, we obtain a southern wage disadvantage close to zero. Adding control for city size (as in
the middle set of bars) or amenities (on the right side) compresses these differentials further. With partial
price adjustment there is no southern wage penalty – or premium – requiring explanation.
The story with city size (not shown) is much the same. Workers in the largest metropolitan area
realize large nominal wage advantages; with full price adjustment the estimate flips to a wage
disadvantage, and with partial adjustment for prices a plausible (i.e., small) wage gap estimate in between
the other two is obtained.
What is the implication of this analysis? The obvious implication is that interarea wage
differences are far smaller than commonly believed. They are not zero, but we are much closer to the law
of one wage than standard analysis would lead us to believe. The appropriate area wage “calculator” is
not one that adjusts by an area price index, but rather by a wage index that compares workers of similar
skill in similar occupations across cities.
IX.

Summing Up
This address pulls together several strands of my research. The studies discussed differ in subject

matter, groups studied, and questions being asked. They have in common a focus on wage determination
and wage gaps. The theoretical approach across many of the studies is similar, as are empirical methods
and some of the data sources. Can these disparate lines of research be used to make general statements
about wage gaps or to draw lessons about the study of wage determination? At a broad level, I contend
that the answer is yes. Our understanding of the economic theory of labor demand, labor supply, and
15

human capital provides a common foundation or framework for interpreting empirical evidence. There
are numerous reasons why Adam Smith’s theory of compensating wage differentials and the law of one
wage should not and does not strictly hold in real-world labor markets. Yet the law of one wage provides
a fundamental and remarkably useful approach not only to describe market wage determination, but also
to identify and interpret existing wage gaps. It remains our single most powerful tool and the necessary
starting point for most wage analyses. This is no small thing.
But I see the lessons learned as more idiosyncratic. The theory of compensating differentials and
law of one wage is just a starting point, providing only a rough approximation of real world markets.
Yes, the basic theory is powerful. And no doubt it is important that we proselytize the virtues (and
limitations) of standard theory to students and non-economists. For me and perhaps most labor
economists, however, it is more enlightening and rewarding to focus instead on the heterogeneity of labor
market outcomes. It is in understanding heterogeneity that theoretical and empirical labor economics
tends to advance. Deep insight and an understanding of how labor markets operate require a nuanced
perspective, one that extends beyond a textbook description of markets and includes knowledge of
institutions, law, and history. Psychology and sociology likewise can inform our understanding of labor
markets, although these approaches are less evident in my work.
A more mundane but no less important lesson learned is that data issues are important. One
cannot reliably know what data tell us if one does not first understand data limitations and strengths.
Such an understanding requires thorough knowledge of how data surveys are constructed and attention to
a host of measurement and estimation issues. Empirical work also requires meticulous attention be given
to programming and documentation, to make sure data are more rather than less reliable once they have
been processed and manipulated by the researcher.
I have found that empirical explorations examining particular labor markets, say, nursing or
airlines, or those addressing policy or other questions of interest about labor markets, for example, the
effects of deregulation on unions and earnings, to be worthy and fulfilling endeavors. Apart from their
specific contributions, they have provided me, and perhaps a few readers, with a better understanding of
the diversity of economic and social arrangements that have evolved across U.S. labor markets.
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Fig. 4: Union Wage Gaps by Education
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Fig. 6: Union and Nonunion Employment in Motor
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